We examine the usefulness of deferred tax expense as compared to various accrual measures employed in prior research in detecting earnings management in three settings where earnings management likely occurs. The motivation for using deferred tax expense to detect earnings management is that there is typically more discretion under generally accepted accounting principles than under tax rules, and we assume that managers exploit such discretion to manage income upwards primarily in ways that do not affect current taxable income. Thus, we expect that decisions to manage earnings upwards will generate book-tax differences that increase deferred tax expense.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we propose and evaluate the use of deferred income tax expense as a metric for detecting earnings management. Building on the evidence of earnings management in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Mills and Newberry (2001) , we investigate the usefulness of deferred tax expense in identifying earnings management to meet three earnings targets: (1) to avoid reporting an earnings decline, (2) to avoid reporting a loss, and (3) to avoid failing to meet analysts' earnings forecasts. Detecting earnings management is important in assessing the quality of earnings, and should be useful to researchers studying earnings management behavior and to financial analysts in their examination of financial reports. Moreover, evidence that book income is managed in ways that do not affect taxable income contributes to the debate as to whether book income should be the basis for taxation (Yin 2000; Manzon and Plesko 2001) . Prior research has sought to detect earnings management by using various accrual measures as proxies for managerial discretion. However, Guay et al. (1996) demonstrate that accruals derived from five alternative models reflect considerable imprecision. In particular, only the Jones (1991) and modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995 ) models yield abnormal accruals that differ significantly from a random assignment of total accruals into normal and abnormal components, and thus have characteristics consistent with accruals that reflect managerial opportunism. Bernard and Skinner (1996) argue that abnormal accruals estimated using Jonestype models reflect measurement error due in part to the systematic misclassification of normal accruals as abnormal accruals.
1 Basing income taxation on book income rather than taxable income would reduce the level of complexity of income tax rules, and would mean that manipulation of book earnings would induce a tax cost. However, Slemrod (2002) argues that income inherently is an accrual concept, and that it is easier to administer a tax system based on transactions or realizations.
We take a different tact and argue that measurement error in accrual metrics used to detect earnings management can be reduced by focusing on deferred tax expense instead of attempting to decompose accruals into normal and abnormal components. Deferred tax expense is a component of a firm's total income tax expense and reflects the tax effects of temporary differences between book income (i.e., income reported to shareholders and other external users) and taxable income (i.e., income reported to the tax authorities) that arise primarily from accruals for revenue and expense items that affect both book and taxable income, but in different periods.
We claim that deferred tax expense can be used to better measure managers' discretionary choices under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) because the tax law, in general, allows less discretion in accounting choices relative to the discretion that exists under GAAP (Mills and Newberry 2001; Manzon and Plesko 2001; Hanlon 2002; Joos et al. 2002; Plesko 2002) . Hence, we expect that managers seeking to manage earnings to achieve some threshold (e.g., to avoid reporting an earnings decline) do so by exploiting the greater discretion they have for financial reporting purposes vis-à-vis tax reporting. Moreover, we assume that managers prefer to manage book income upwards without also increasing taxable income. Thus, the exercise of managerial discretion to manage income upwards should generate temporary book-tax differences that increase deferred tax expense, and hence deferred tax expense will be useful in detecting such earnings management. 2 To be sure, firms can manage book income without generating temporary book-tax differences. For example, managers can manage earnings by engaging in a limited set of transactions that create permanent book-tax differences. Managers also can make accrual decisions or take actions that change operating cash flows that affect both book and taxable income simultaneously. However, these actions increase current income taxes payable, and if managers take such actions or decisions, we would not detect earnings management using deferred tax expense. Hence, deferred tax expense may not capture all earnings management activity, and it is an empirical question whether deferred tax expense is useful for detecting earnings management beyond various accrual measures that have been used in prior research.
We analyze three settings in which the literature argues earnings management likely occurs. The first case we consider is earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. We compare firm-years with zero or slightly positive scaled earnings changes to "just missed" firmyears (i.e., firm-years with slightly negative earnings changes). The results indicate that increases in deferred tax expense increase the probability of managing earnings to avoid reporting an earnings decline, supporting the argument that deferred tax expense is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management. Total accruals and abnormal accruals estimated using the forward-looking Jones model (Dechow et al. 2002) are also incrementally useful, while abnormal accruals derived from the modified Jones model are not. We find no evidence that any one metric more accurately classifies firm-years as successfully (or unsuccessfully) avoiding an earnings decline. When we examine the impact of firm performance on the results, we find that the accrual measures are no longer significant, while the deferred tax expense results still hold.
The second case we examine is earnings management to avoid a loss, and we compare firm-years with zero or slightly positive scaled earnings levels with a control sample of firmyears with slightly negative earnings. The results suggest that increases in deferred tax expense increase the probability of managing earnings to avoid reporting a loss. Thus deferred tax expense is also incrementally useful in detecting earnings management in this setting, as are the accrual metrics. However, we find that deferred tax expense is relatively more accurate than each of the accrual measures in classifying firm-years as successfully (or unsuccessfully) avoiding a loss.
Finally, we investigate the usefulness of deferred tax expense in detecting earnings management to avoid failing to meet or beat consensus analysts' earnings forecasts. The literature argues that firms manage earnings upwards in this setting, although the evidence in support of this result is mixed (e.g., Schwartz 2001; Dechow et al. 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2002) . We find no evidence that deferred tax expense or the abnormal accrual metrics detect earnings management to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts, whereas total accruals is positively related to the probability that a firm manages earnings in this setting. However, neither the accrual-based metrics nor deferred tax expense more accurately classifies firm-years as successfully (or unsuccessfully) failing to meet or beat analysts' forecasts.
Overall, our results support the incremental usefulness of deferred tax expense as a metric to detect earnings management. Surprisingly, we find that total accruals is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management activity for each of our three earnings targets, while the abnormal accrual measures are less consistent. Thus, research based solely on accrual measures may not detect the full effects of earnings management, and thus researchers should also consider incorporating deferred tax expense into their earnings management research designs.
In the next section we develop the intuition underlying our testable hypotheses, summarize relevant prior research, and provide institutional background about the accounting for book-tax differences. Section III describes the empirical design and data. Section IV presents our primary empirical results and supplemental analyses. We conclude in section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Earnings Management, Discretion, Accruals, and Book-Tax Differences
Earnings management is accomplished through managerial discretion over accounting choices and operating cash flows. Discretion over accruals generally is less observable than management's choices of accounting methods and less costly to implement than altering operating cash flows. Thus, researchers have increasingly used accrual variables to detect earnings management. For example, Healy (1985) uses total accruals to proxy for "discretionary" (i.e., "abnormal") accruals while Jones (1991) estimates regressions of total accruals on factors reflecting changes in a firm's economic environment to detect earnings management, and uses the residuals to proxy for abnormal accruals.
3, 4 Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones model to allow for the possibility that managers use discretion to accrue revenues when it is questionable whether revenue recognition criteria have been met. Dechow et al. (1995) also assess the ability of accrual models to detect earnings management and find that the modified Jones model is the most powerful in detecting earnings management in a sample of firms the SEC identified for overstating earnings. Similarly, the evidence in Guay et al. (1996) suggests that only the Jones and modified Jones models produce abnormal accruals that are distinguishable from a random decomposition of earnings and thus consistent with abnormal accruals resulting from managerial decisions to increase and/or smooth income. Thus, current evidence suggests that "abnormal" accruals poorly measure the discretion managers exercise to manage earnings.
3 DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) investigate the relation between debt covenant restrictions and accrual choices and report consistent results using both time-series and cross-sectional versions of the Jones model. 4 DeAngelo (1986) uses the change in total accruals, which implicitly assumes that "normal" accruals are constant over time so that a change in accruals reflects abnormal accruals. Dechow (1994) shows that total accruals are mean-reverting; hence, part of the change in total accruals is expected.
We argue that timing (i.e., temporary) book-tax differences will help separate discretion in managers' actions from nondiscretionary choices. As Plesko (2002, 112) notes, "timing differences can arise from different reporting rules under each system, but also because GAAP allows managers greater discretion in determining the amounts of income and expense in each period than does the tax system." For instance, GAAP allows flexibility in estimating the provision for bad debts while tax rules allow a deduction only for accounts receivable actually written off. 5 Similarly, there is more discretion in choosing useful lives for depreciation under GAAP as compared to the limited flexibility for determining assets' cost recovery periods for tax purposes. There is also more discretion over GAAP revenue recognition. While firms' revenue recognition methods may initially be the same for tax and book purposes, firms that subsequently change to more aggressive methods for financial reporting must continue with their initial tax method unless permission to change is requested and approved by the IRS. There is also discretion over when to recognize unearned revenue as revenue for book purposes, while firms generally must recognize advance payments as income when received for tax purposes. More generally, accruals that require managers' estimates such as post-retirement benefits, restructurings, warranties, and self-insurance reserves generate temporary book-tax differences.
In contrast, accruals such as those for accounts receivable, wages, and accounts payable that arguably are subject to less managerial discretion typically do not generate temporary book-tax differences.
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Besides having greater discretion for GAAP than for tax purposes, we also assume that, all else equal, firms seeking to manage book income upwards do so without increasing their tax 5 GAAP allows for the possibility of increasing income by managing the provision for uncollectible accounts. This results in a smaller deferred tax asset than would otherwise be reported, and thus a larger deferred tax expense. 6 Firms with different revenue recognition policies for book and tax purposes may have book-tax differences resulting from accounts receivable. Also, accruals for deferred compensation (i.e., compensation paid beyond two and one-half months of year-end) will also generate book-tax differences.
costs. This assumption, which is analogous to the assumption that it is less costly for managers to manage earnings via accruals rather than operating cash flows, applies both to firms facing non-trivial positive marginal income tax rates and to firms with a zero current marginal tax rate.
Firms in the former group have a current tax incentive to increase book income in ways that do not increase current tax expense, while firms in the latter group that do not have unlimited amounts of loss carryforwards may also seek to minimize the present value of their income taxes.
We thus argue that book-tax differences resulting from accruals that do not increase current taxable will help separate discretion from non-discretion. Prior research has linked booktax differences to earnings management activity. Mills and Newberry (2001) present evidence that firms with earnings management incentives have greater differences between book and taxable income. In particular, public (versus private) firms, highly leveraged privately-held firms, and financially distressed privately-held firms all have greater book-tax differences.
Based on untabulated results they note that firms reporting slightly positive earnings changes have larger book-tax differences than firms with slightly negative earnings changes. While Mills and Newberry (2001) observe actual book-tax differences using confidential tax return data, we use deferred tax expense, a publicly-available measure, as our empirical surrogate for book-tax differences and investigate publicly-traded firms' earnings management behavior. We also extend Mills and Newberry (2001) by comparing the abilities of deferred tax expense and accrual-based metrics used in prior research to detect earnings management activity.
Deferred tax expense, our proxy for book-tax differences, is computed in accordance with Under SFAS No. 109, the increase (decrease) in net deferred tax liability for a period can equal a firm's deferred tax expense (benefit) for the period, but differences are common.
Differences typically occur when firms engage in mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures, or report other comprehensive income items, and can affect deferred tax accounts on the balance sheet without affecting deferred tax expense on the income statement. We focus on deferred tax expense as our empirical surrogate for book-tax differences because it reflects temporary booktax differences associated with the income statement. gives full recognition to deferred tax assets. However, if it is "more likely than not" that a deferred tax asset will not be realized, then a firm must provide a valuation allowance to offset it (FASB 1992, ¶17e). 8 Deferred tax expense itself conceivably might be decomposed further into normal and abnormal components, but this would require a model of the determinants of deferred tax expense in the absence of earnings management, which we leave for future research. Absent such a model, it might seem that change in deferred tax expense would be a reasonable proxy; however, it does not have a straightforward interpretation. Specifically, DTE t -DTE t-1 = NDTL t -2NDTL t-1 + NDTL t-2 , where DTE = deferred tax expense, and NDTL = net deferred tax liability = deferred tax liabilities -deferred tax assets. Under SFAS No. 109, DTE is a change variable derived from changes in balance sheet accounts, and is unlikely to follow a random walk. If managers engage in earnings management to increase earnings but not taxable, then regardless of how the target is defined (e.g., last year's earnings), such earnings management generates book-tax differences that result in a higher DTE than would be observed in the absence of such activity. Thus, the level of DTE, not the change in DTE, is the appropriate variable.
Earnings Thresholds
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) hypothesize that managers have strong incentives to avoid reporting an earnings decrease and to avoid reporting a loss. They provide evidence of earnings management by documenting a higher frequency of zero or small increases in earnings than expected in cross-sectional distributions of annual scaled earnings changes. 9 They find similar results for zero and slightly positive earnings levels. We assess the usefulness of deferred tax expense, our empirical proxy for book-tax differences that reflect managerial discretion, to detect earnings management beyond accrual measures used in prior research by investigating whether these variables detect earnings management in the settings Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) consider, i.e., to avoid reporting an earnings decline and to avoid reporting a loss. Hence, we test the following hypotheses:
H1: Deferred tax expense is incrementally useful to accrual measures in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline.
H2: Deferred tax expense is incrementally useful to accrual measures in detecting earnings management to avoid a loss.
Managers also have incentives to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts. For example, Bartov et al. (2000) and Kasznik and McNichols (1999) find that the market rewards firms that meet or beat analysts' forecasts. Unlike avoiding a loss or an earnings decline where the threshold is fixed (e.g., zero or last year's earnings), managers can provide guidance to analysts to induce them to lower their forecasts prior to firms' earnings announcements (e.g., Schwartz 2001; Matsumoto 2002) . This complicates our analysis of gauging the usefulness of alternative metrics in detecting earnings management in the analyst forecast setting. However, there is not a consensus in the literature about how to measure managerial guidance (e.g., Schwartz 2001), and we do not control for the impact of guidance. Thus our examination of earnings management to meet or beat analysts'
forecasts is limited and exploratory.
10

III. EMPIRICAL DESIGN
Research Design
Our empirical analysis compares the ability of deferred tax expense and various accrual measures to detect earnings management. We consider three situations in which earnings management likely is present: firm-years with zero or slightly positive earnings changes, firmyears with zero or slightly positive earnings levels, and firm-years where earnings exactly equal or slightly exceed analysts' forecasts.
To investigate earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional model using probit regression:
(1) where it EM = 1 if the change in firm i's net income (annual Compustat data item #172) from year t-1 to t divided by the market value of equity at the end of year t-2 (annual Compustat data items #25 × #199) is ≥ 0 and < 0.01, and 0 otherwise; 10 Dhaliwal et al. (2002) document earnings management to meet analysts' forecasts by examining a specific accrual, namely total tax expense. They hypothesize that the last accrual managers estimate and auditors endorse is tax expense, which occurs just prior to firms' announcing their annual earnings. Managing total tax expense is, they believe, a last resort for earnings management. In this setting, any guidance of analysts will have already occurred and thus would not confound their analysis. to control for the effect that a change in cash flows from continuing operations has on a firm's status as an earnings management firm. Increases in operating cash flows reflect increases in current performance and reduce the need to manage earnings to achieve a zero or slightly positive earnings change. Finally, we include 2-digit SIC industry dummy variables to control for possible differences across industries in the tendency to meet or beat earnings targets.
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With regard to the setting of avoiding a loss, consistent with Dechow et al. (2002) we compare firm-years with zero or slightly positive scaled earnings levels to firm-years with slightly negative scaled earnings levels (i.e., a just missed control sample). We estimate equation (1) We interpret a positive coefficient on DTE as providing evidence that DTE is incrementally useful to the respective accrual-based measure in detecting earnings management in this setting.
Finally, to study the analysts' forecast setting we estimate equation (1) after redefining EM it to equal 1 if firm i's year t analysts' earnings forecast error is zero or one cent per share, and 0 if it is negative one cent. A positive and significant coefficient on DTE and/or on any of the accrual metrics included in the model would indicate that the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' forecasts is increasing in DTE and/or the accrual metric and would provide evidence of their incremental usefulness in detecting earnings management in this setting.
Accrual Models
We use total accruals (Healy 1985) , modified Jones abnormal accruals (Dechow et al. 1995) , and forward-looking abnormal accruals (Dechow et al. 2002) as proxies for accruals that reflect earnings management. Total accruals is earnings from continuing operations minus cash flows from continuing operations: (3) and estimate the model separately using non-EM = 1 firm-years for each 2-digit SIC group-year with at least ten firms. We then use the estimated parameters in equation (3) to compute abnormal accruals (denoted AbAccMJ).
We also estimate abnormal accruals using Dechow et al.'s (2002) forward-looking model:
where k = the slope coefficient from a regression of (4) positive scaled earnings changes to firm-years with slightly negative scaled earnings changes.
Our selection procedures generate samples that range from 3,342 to 4,128 firm-years in the probit analysis, depending on the accrual variable to which DTE is being compared.
Approximately 60 percent of the firm-years have scaled earnings changes that are zero or slightly positive (i.e., greater than or equal to zero and less than 0.01 of the market value of equity), and they comprise our earnings management (i.e., EM = 1) sample for this analysis. Firm-years with scaled earnings changes that are greater than or equal to -0.01 and less than zero of the market value of equity comprise the just missed (i.e., EM = 0) control sample.
We employ the same criteria to select the earnings management and just missed samples AFEs between minus and plus one cent per share, inclusive. We then merge the AFEs with our database of firm-year data needed to do the empirical analyses (e.g., DTE and data to compute accrual metrics). Finally, we delete firms having I/B/E/S stock split adjustment factors more than three to eliminate likely EM misclassifications due to rounding problems (see Baber and Kang 2002; Payne and Thomas 2002) . This yields samples of 2,179 and 2,530 observations, depending on the accrual metric computed. Approximately 80% of the firm-year observations are in the EM = 1 (i.e., the meet or just beat analysts' earnings forecasts) group.
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IV. RESULTS
Graphical Evidence: Deferred Tax Expense and Earnings Thresholds
For descriptive purposes, we provide evidence of the relation between scaled deferred tax expense and, respectively, earnings changes, earnings levels, and AFEs. Note, however, our primary analyses focus on the intervals around the earnings thresholds we are considering. slightly positive earnings interval. Graphs for accruals (not shown) suggest that mean TAcc also becomes less negative while the means of both abnormal accruals metrics sharply increase.
[Insert Figure 5 here] Figure 6 shows the histogram of mean DTE by AFE intervals. Mean DTE is 0.0002 in the negative once cent per share interval, and 0.0005 and 0.0008, respectively, in the zero and one cent per share intervals. The graph of total accruals (not shown) also shows higher accrual measures in the meet or beat intervals relative to the just missed interval, while the graphs of the abnormal accrual measures do not.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for our comparison of firm-years with zero or slightly positive earnings changes versus firm-years with slightly negative earnings changes. For the EM = 1 sample, the mean DTE is 0.0015, or 0.15% of beginning-of-year total assets (median = 0.0000), with values ranging from -9.33% to 7% of total assets. Not surprisingly, total accruals is substantially larger in magnitude and negative. The mean TAcc is -0.0443 or -4.43% of beginning-of-year total assets (median = -0.0392), and the range is from -76.42% to 89.90%. In the just missed control sample, mean DTE is 0.0005 (median = 0.0000) and mean TAcc is -0.0502 (median = -0.0448). Both abnormal accruals variables have negative means and medians in both samples.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We statistically compare the two samples on a univariate basis (p-values are two-tailed).
We expect that if firms manage earnings upwards to avoid reporting an earnings decline, then earnings management metrics should reflect this activity. In particular, we expect greater deferred tax expense and greater accrual values in earnings management firm-years than in control firm-years. The results indicate that the mean and median for both DTE and TAcc are significantly larger in the EM = 1 sample of firm-years that avoid an earnings decline than in the just missed control sample. However, we do not observe significantly larger abnormal accruals for the EM = 1 firm-years. Panel A also indicates that changes in operating cash flows are reliably larger for EM = 1 firm-years, supporting its inclusion as a control variable in equation (1).
Descriptive statistics for our analysis of earnings levels appear in Panel B of Table 1 .
Consistent with DTE identifying earnings management activity to avoid a loss, the DTE mean of -0.0027 for the earnings interval of 0 to less than 0.02 of market value of equity is significantly greater (i.e., less negative) than the DTE mean of -0.0056 for the just missed sample. (The median is also higher in the EM = 1 sample.) The negative mean s DTE' indicate an average deferred tax benefit, which implies that the average firm in both earnings levels samples reports taxable income higher than book income. Average TAcc is also greater in the EM = 1 sample, although neither the mean nor median for AbAccMJ or for AbAccFL differ between the samples. Table 1 reveals no significant differences in mean and median DTE between the EM = 1 and EM = 0 samples in the analysts' forecast setting. Means and medians for TAcc and the abnormal accrual variables also are not significantly different.
Panel C of
Untabulated results indicate that across the three settings we consider, there are reliably positive correlations between change in net income and change in operating cash flows, consistent with Dechow (1994) , and reliably negative correlations between total accruals and cash flows from operations, consistent with Sloan (1996) . Additionally, DTE and the three accrual metrics generally are uncorrelated, which is consistent with Hanlon (2002). We find small but significantly positive correlations between EM and DTE in the earnings change and earnings levels settings. EM and TAcc are significantly positively associated in the earnings change and earnings levels settings, while correlations between EM and the abnormal accrual measures are insignificant.
Primary Results
Our primary results provide evidence concerning the incremental usefulness of deferred tax expense vis-à-vis each accrual measure in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, to avoid a loss, and to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts' forecasts. Table 2 presents the results of comparing deferred tax expense ( DTE ) with total accruals ( TAcc ) across the three earnings management settings, Table 3 compares DTE with AbAccMJ, and Table 4 compares DTE and AbAccFL. Indicated p-values are one-tailed. Table 2 reports the results of estimating probit models with both DTE and TAcc as test variables. 17 The first set of results is shown in the left-hand pair of columns labeled "Earnings Target 1: Scaled Earnings Changes" and concerns earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. The middle set of columns, labeled "Earnings Target 2: Scaled Earnings," presents the results for earnings management to avoid a loss, and the right-hand set of columns, labeled "Earnings Target 3: Analysts' Forecasts," displays the results related to earnings management to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts.
Deferred Tax Expense Versus Total Accruals
[Insert Table 2 here]
With regard to the first set of results, the coefficient on DTE is positive (3.8039) and is significant (p = 0.0147), suggesting that deferred tax expense is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline after controlling for total accruals, changes in operating cash flows, and industry. The coefficient on TAcc equals 1.1024, and is also significant (p < 0.0001), indicating that total accruals is also incrementally useful in detecting earnings management in this setting. As expected, CFO ∆ is positive and significant.
The middle column of results reported in Table 2 are similar to the first set. The coefficient on DTE is positive (5.4424) and significant (p = 0.0127), as is the coefficient on TAcc (41.5710, p < 0.0001). Hence, deferred tax expense is incrementally useful beyond total accruals in identifying earnings management to avoid a loss. Likewise, TAcc is incrementally useful beyond DTE in this setting. CFO is reliably positive.
In the third column of results in Table 2 , TAcc has a significant coefficient (p = 0.0422),
whereas DTE does not, and thus only total accruals is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid failing to meet analysts' forecasts. Recall that prior research on earnings management in this setting provides conflicting evidence, and there is evidence that managerial guidance of analysts' forecasts is perhaps more important in this setting.
Deferred Tax Expense Versus Abnormal Accruals
We report the results of the comparison of deferred tax expense and abnormal accruals derived from the modified Jones model in Table 3 . The coefficient of DTE is positive and significant when considering both scaled earnings changes (3.6888, p < 0.0178) and scaled earnings levels (8.8132, p < 0.0001), but is insignificant for the analysis of analysts' forecast errors. The coefficient on AbAccMJ is only significant in the setting in which firms manage earnings to avoid a loss (Column 2 of Table 3 ). Thus, DTE is incrementally useful to modified Jones model abnormal accruals in detecting earnings management to avoid reporting an earnings decline and to avoid a loss, whereas modified Jones abnormal accruals are incrementally useful only in the latter setting.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 4 [Insert Table 4 here]
Summary of Primary Results
Overall, the results provide support for hypotheses H1 and H2, but not H3. Deferred tax expense is generally incrementally useful to the various accrual-based measures in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline (H1) and to avoid reporting a loss (H2), but not in detecting earnings management with regard to avoiding failing to meet or beat analysts' forecasts (H3). Abnormal accruals derived from either the modified Jones model or the forwardlooking model are sometimes incrementally useful to DTE in detecting earnings management.
Somewhat surprisingly, total accruals is incrementally useful to DTE in detecting earnings management in all three settings we consider. Forward-looking abnormal accruals are incrementally useful in the earnings change and earnings levels settings, while modified Jones model abnormal accruals are incrementally useful only in the former setting.
Supplemental Analyses
We perform an additional analysis in which we consider the relative, rather than incremental, usefulness of deferred tax expense versus the accrual-based measures in detecting earnings management by assessing their ability to classify firm-years as EM = 1 or EM = 0.
More specifically, we perform a Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) analysis (see Sprinkle and Tubbs 1998), which Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) argue is appropriate for this purpose when using logit-type models. Compared to a naïve classification percentage, ROC analysis provides a more complete description of classification accuracy by plotting the probability of detecting a true positive and a false positive using the entire distribution of the test diagnostic (e.g., DTE and the accrual-based metrics) as potential cut-off points; i.e., observations above the test diagnostic's cut-off point are classified as positives (e.g., EM = 1) and those below as negatives (e.g., EM = 0). For the settings we consider, the area under the ROC curve is determined by randomly selecting pairs of firm-years, an EM = 1 and EM = 0, and testing to determine if the respective earnings management measure (e.g., DTE) is higher for the EM = 1 firm-year relative to the EM = 0 firm-year. The area under the ROC curve equals the percentage of randomly drawn pairs for which the earnings management measure is in fact higher for the EM = 1 observations. In untabulated results, we find that the area under the ROC curve is not significantly different between DTE and each of the accrual-based measures in the scaled earnings changes and analysts' forecast settings, but it is significantly greater for DTE than for each accrual-based measure in the scaled earnings levels setting. Thus, in the latter setting and in terms of overall classification accuracy, DTE is relatively more useful than total accruals and both modified Jones and forward-looking abnormal accruals in accurately classifying firm-years as earnings managing or non-earnings managing firm-years. In the setting in which firms manage earnings to avoid an earnings decline or to avoid failing to meet or beat the consensus analysts' forecast, neither DTE nor any accrual-based measure is relatively more useful in classifying firm-years.
We assess the sensitivity of the primary results in a number of additional ways (details not shown). First, we use logit and OLS regressions in place of probit and obtain similar results.
Second, we estimate separate probit regressions for each of the seven sample years. In the earnings change analysis the mean estimated coefficient on DTE is 4.97 (Fama-MacBeth tstatistic = 2.07, p-value < 0.03), and in the earnings level analysis the mean DTE coefficient across the seven annual regressions is 6.27 (Fama-MacBeth t-statistic = 4.47, p-value < 0.0001).
Third, we augment the probit model for earnings changes with the level of operating cash flows (and with the change in operating cash flows for the earnings levels case) to further control for current performance. Our inferences remain unchanged. This is also the case when we include the square of the cash flow variable to control for possible non-linearity in the relation between EM and (change in) operating cash flows.
Fourth, we augment the probit regressions with three additional control variables. The first two control variables are asset growth and revenue growth, each measured over the prior three years. We include these variables to control for the possibility that DTE is proxying for growth and that EM = 1 firms are simply high growth firms relative to EM = 0 firms. The third control variable, average return on assets over the prior three years, serves as an additional control for performance (i.e., beyond (changes in) operating cash flows), which may affect the ability of accrual variables to detect earnings management (McNichols 2000) . Including these control variables in the probit models does not eliminate the significance of DTE.
Fifth, we further investigate whether firm performance drives our result that DTE is incrementally useful to the accrual-based metrics in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. It is possible that higher DTE is a proxy for high performance and that EM = 1 firms are simply higher performing firms than EM = 0 firms. We define performance alternatively as pre-tax and after-tax return on lagged total assets (ROA), further define high performance firm-years as those in the upper third of the distribution of the performance variable, and drop firm-years in the middle third of the distribution to focus on performance extremes (e.g., McNichols 2000). We then regress EM on DTE, the accrual variable, the dummy variable indicating high performance, and multiplicative terms interacting the high performance dummy variable with, respectively, DTE and the particular accrual variable. Our primary results are unaffected and the coefficients on the DTE×High ROA variables are insignificant. However, controlling for firm performance makes the estimated coefficients on the accrual measures insignificant. Thus, while firm performance does not drive the significance of the DTE results, it does drive the significance of the accrual metrics results.
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Sixth, because deferred taxes and accruals reverse in the subsequent year(s), we investigate whether such reversals affect our results. We include EM t-1 and define it to equal 1 if a firm's earnings change (or earnings level) fell into the meet or just beat interval the previous period, and 0 otherwise. We also interact EM t-1 with year t's DTE and accrual metric. If reversals affect our results, then the coefficient on DTE t × EM t-1 in both the avoid an earnings decline and avoid a loss settings will be negative. Our primary results remain unchanged and the coefficients on the interaction of DTE t and EM t-1 is insignificant. We interpret these results as evidence that reversals are not driving our primary findings. Compustat data items (#63+#64)/#170). We find these are higher for EM = 1 firm-years in both the avoid an earnings decline and avoid a loss settings. Higher current effective tax rates for EM = 1 firm-years suggests it is unlikely that the higher average DTE for these firm-years results from tax planning strategies that reduce taxable income relative to book income, since such strategies would reduce current tax expense and current effective tax rates.
Second, we include in our probit regressions a dummy variable for low current tax expense, which equals 1 if a firm-year falls in the bottom third of the distribution of current tax expense scaled by total assets. We also interact that dummy variable with DTE and with the accrual variable. We reestimate the augmented models and find that our primary results are unaffected while the coefficient on DTE×Low Current Tax Expense is not significant. We perform a similar analysis by deleting firm-years in the bottom third of the distribution of current tax expense scaled by total assets and our primary results remain unchanged. We conclude that low current tax expense firm-years (i.e., those that engage in tax planning to lower taxable income relative to book income) do not drive the positive relation between DTE and EM.
Overall, the supplemental analyses reinforce the support for the basic hypothesis that deferred tax expense is incrementally useful to the accrual metrics in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and to avoid a loss.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the incremental usefulness of deferred tax expense in detecting earnings management. Because earnings management is accomplished using managerial discretion, and because managers generally have more discretion under GAAP than under tax rules, we expect that managers will manage earnings upwards by exploiting their discretion under GAAP, and will presumably do so in a manner that does not increase current income taxes payable. If so, such earnings management behavior will generate temporary book-tax differences that lead to higher deferred tax expense. Building on evidence of earnings management in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , Degeorge et al. (1999), and Mills and Newberry (2001) , and on evidence of significant measurement error in accrual measures in Guay et al. (1996) and Bernard and Skinner (1996) , we compare the abilities of deferred tax expense and three accrual-based measures to detect earnings management to meet or slightly beat three earnings targets: avoiding an earnings decline, avoiding a loss, and avoiding failing to meet or beat analysts' forecasts.
The results support the incremental usefulness of deferred tax expense in detecting earnings management. Deferred tax expense is generally incrementally useful to all three accrual measures in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and in detecting earnings management to avoid a loss. We also find that DTE is significantly more accurate than the three accrual measures in classifying firm-years as earnings management and non-earnings management firm-years with regard to avoiding a loss. Finally, DTE is not incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts' forecasts.
Our results add to recent findings that indicate a relation between book and tax reporting and firms' incentives to engage in earnings management activities (Mills and Newberry 2001) .
The evidence in our paper suggests that DTE can supplement accrual measures in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and to avoid a loss. Surprisingly, our results suggest that total accruals is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management activities in the three settings we consider, while the performance of abnormal accrual measures is mixed.
Further, there is evidence that firm performance can adversely affect the usefulness of the accrual measures in detecting earnings management, whereas that does not appear to be the case for deferred tax expense.
A limitation of our study is that our analysis is restricted to the period in which SFAS No.
109 has been in effect. Another limitation is that we have not incorporated managerial guidance into our investigation of the ability to detect earnings management to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts; we leave that for future research. Future research might also fruitfully consider (1) modeling the determinants of deferred tax expense to discover whether DTE itself can be usefully decomposed, (2) identifying the components of DTE that reflect most earnings management activity, and (3) examining the usefulness of DTE and accrual variables to detect earnings management in quarterly data and in other settings. Earnings Target 3: Analysts' Forecasts. Earnings management to avoid failing to meet or beat analysts' forecasts, where EM 3 = 1 firm-years have analyst forecast errors (actual EPS less mean consensus forecast) at least 0 and less than or equal to .01 and EM 3 = 0 firm-years have analyst forecast errors at least -.01 and less than 0.
